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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (15 Dec 67) FOR OT RD-670613

21 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
2d Battalion (175mm)(SP), 32d Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSTOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION (175MM)(SP), 32D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96216

AVGE-ZC

1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGE-C
APO 96289

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam, Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FAC
APO 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DH
APO 96375

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Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel

a. The 2d Battalion (175mm Gun SP), 32d Artillery, remains assigned to the

FOR OT RD
670613
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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23d Artillery Group.

b. Normal S-1 activities have been conducted during the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967.

c. Personnel strength of the command on 31 July 1967 was

	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters Battery	15	0	114	21	1	140	21	1	144
Battery A	3	0	100	3	0	101	3	0	101
Battery B	3	0	100	3	0	101	3	0	120
Battery C	3	0	100	3	0	101	3	0	102
Service Battery	2	3	79	2	3	81	2	3	92
TOTALS	26	3	493	32	4	524	32	4	559

d. Throughout the quarter this unit experienced shortages in MOS 13B40 and 94B20. Most of these shortages have now been alleviated by promotions and arrivals of replacements.

e. Personnel changes during this quarter included:

GAINS:	OFF	WO	EM	LOSSES:	OFF	WO	EM
	20	1	137		19	1	138

f. Casualties included:

TYPE	NUMBER
Killed in Action	0
Wounded in Action	1
Missing in Action	0
Non-battle dead	0
Non-battle casualties	1

g. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

TYPE	NUMBER
Bronze Star (Merit)	8
Air Medal (Merit)	7
Air Medal (Merit-Oak Leaf Cluster)	16
Army Commendation Medal	2
Purple Heart	1

NOTE: In addition to these awards, 18 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USARV.

h. R&R Program schedules include the following:

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(1) The in-country R&R consisting of 3 day passes to VUNG TAU has been used by 18 personnel.

(2) The out-of-country R&R included the following 5 day quotas:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	8	8	10	26
Tokyo	4	2	2	8
Manila	2	0	1	3
Hong Kong	2	3	1	6
Taipei	5	8	10	23
Singapore	1	1	2	4
Kuala Lumpur	2	0	1	3
Penang	2	1	1	4
Hawaii	5	14	9	28
TOTALS	31	37	37	105

i. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. APO numbers for the units are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO</u>
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery	96216
Battery A	96353
Battery B	96216
Battery C	96216
Service Battery	96216

j. Judicial actions by units included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
Headquarters Battery	15	0	1	0
Battery A	10	1	0	0
Battery B	6	0	0	0
Battery C	9	0	0	0
Service Battery	5	0	1	0
TOTALS	35	1	2	0

k. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	1035
Admitted to hospital	18
Evacuated within the country	4
Evacuated out of country	1
Malaria cases	0

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1. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Headquarters Battery	0	0	0
Battery A	0	0	0
Battery B	1	0	2
Battery C	0	0	2
Service Battery	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	2	0	4

m. The morale of the command is outstanding. This is evidenced by the fact that 15 personnel took advantage of the six-month extension program during the reporting quarter.

n. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by 25th Infantry Division educational services and USAFI extension courses.

o. Religious Services: Protestant and Catholic services are held on a regular weekly schedule at TAY NINH Base Camp and GU CHI Base Camp. The Group Chaplains conduct services on a scheduled basis for Battery B located at SUOI DA. Protestant services are also held in Battery B, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (adjacent to this headquarters) by that battalion's chaplain.

p. The VD rate within the battalion has not presented a serious problem as evidenced by a pronounced decrease during the quarter. Battery commanders, with the assistance of the battalion surgeon, present frequent orientations and lectures on personal hygiene and prophylactic usage. This has been found to be an effective approach to the problem of venereal disease.

q. The battalion is authorized to employ 180 Direct Hire civilian personnel. These personnel work as Kitchen Helpers, Carpenters, Masons and Laborers, releasing U.S. Military Personnel for military duties. As of 31 July 1967 the battalion employed 171 civilian personnel. During the reporting period two civilian personnel separations occurred. The S1 Section exercises control over all civilian personnel matters in the battalion. In addition to the Direct Hire Civilian personnel, the battalion forecasts and receives funds for hire of day laborers. These laborers are used to complete projects which are temporary in nature such as filling sand bags and clearing fields of fire. Direct Hire personnel are used by all batteries in the battalion. Day laborers are used by Headquarters Battery and Battery B.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. Targeting.

This battalion has the responsibility of providing artillery targeting throughout the TAY NINH Province. This area includes WAR ZONE "C".

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(1) To provide timely and effective targeting the following procedures have been implemented.

(a) Close and continuous liaison with all intelligence and information gathering sources.

(b) Obtaining and plotting Red Haze and SLAR readouts.

(c) Obtaining SPAR reports.

(d) Plotting all known hard targets on the targeting map.

(e) Locating and plotting VC/NVA routes of movements.

(f) Requesting aerial photos of areas of probable VC/NVA base camp and storage areas.

(g) Requesting Red Haze and SLAR missions over areas that indicate the presence of VC/NVA main force units.

(h) Conducting a coordinated, vigorous Visual Reconnaissance program over the Province.

(2) An average of approximately 220 targets were planned daily throughout TAY NINH Province by this headquarters. The type targets provided were:

(a) Probable enemy locations.

(b) Destruction, Harrassing and/or Interdiction missions on known Base Camps.

(c) Harrassing and/or Interdiction of staging areas, routes, storage areas and probabl mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket postions.

(3) Reports form HOI CHANHS (Returnees) and the movement of VC/NVA activities indicate that the targeting has greatly improved and TIMELINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS.

(4) To insure that fires are not scheduled on friendly inhabited villages and hamlets, these areas have been marked on the targeting maps using color codes.

b. Visual Reconnaissance.

(1) The assigned visual reconnaissance area for this battalion is TAY NINH Province. This is approximately 3,000 square-kilometers. This area has been divided into three zones, with a primary and back-up observer assigned to

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each. During the reporting period, this battalion flew visual reconnaissance and artillery adjustment missions with two assigned O-1 aircraft. 9

(2) The VC/NVA main force units apparently have an effective aircraft alert system. Enemy sightings from the air have been rare. To counteract the VC warning system, this battalion is currently testing the effectiveness of flying above 4,500 feet and observing the roads, trails and base camp areas with binoculars. At this altitude, the aircraft is hard to spot and personnel on the ground cannot detect the engine noise until the aircraft has passed over the area. The present cloud cover has restricted this method and no positive recommendations can be made at this time.

c. The following administrative actions have been accomplished during the reporting period:

(1) Validations of clearances

(a) Top Secret 5

(b) Secret 18

(2) Clearances granted

(a) Interim Secret 3

(b) Confidential 6

(3) Cryptographic access

(a) Secret 6

(b) Confidential 4

(4) Local file check completed 41

d. Psychological Warfare.

(1) During the month of July this battalion introduced into its activities, psychological warfare techniques on VC/NVA units.

(2) Fear and CHIEU HOI leaflets were dropped over areas that enemy units were known to occupy. Then the area was attacked with observed and unobserved artillery fires and a systematic heavy H&I program. Persuasion and CHIEU HOI leaflets were then dropped over the area. After a short lull, the process was repeated.

3. (C) Training

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a. On the job training and individual cross training continues in all units.

b. The following period of mandatory training were conducted during the reporting period:

- (1) Command Information: 13 hours.
- (2) Character Guidance: 3 hours.
- (3) Safety: 4 hours.
- (4) Drivers' Training: 3 hours.
- (5) Physical Fitness: 13 hours.
- (6) CBR Refresher: 2 hours.
- (7) Clandestine Surveillance and Listening Devices: 1 hour.
- (8) Intelligence: Defense against subversion and espionage: 2 hours.
- (9) Geneva Convention: 1 hour.
- (10) Armed Forces Censorship: 1 hours.
- (11) Physical Security: 4 hours.
- (12) Familiarization Firing: 2 hours.

c. On 13 June two personnel departed for out-of-country special training returning on 26 June 1967.

d. On 1 June 1967 this headquarters published Standing Operating Procedures--Artillery Control--TAY NINH. The purpose of this SOP is to establish standard procedures and policies for the control of artillery fires in the TAY NINH area. This control includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) Scheduling and supervising the fires of organic units, attached units, or units under the operational control of this headquarters and/or firing in defense of TAY NINH Base Camp.

(2) Obtaining US and ARVN (Political) ground clearance for all US artillery fires in TAY NINH Province.

(3) Programming and scheduling H&I fires for all US firing units located at TAY NINH Base Camp and its immediate environs.

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(4) Scheduling and controlling defensive artillery, mortar, duster and quad-50 fires for TAY NINH Base Camp and its environs.

(5) Operating the Artillery Air Warning Control Center TAY NINH Control, frequency 30.30, for TAY NINH Province.

(6) Plan and coordinate fires for the 155mm ARVN platoon at BEN KEO for defense of US installations and locations within range.

e. On 14 July 1967 the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, published a Letter of Instructions: Artillery Support for LOC (TAY NINH - DAU TIENG) which was drafted by this headquarters. The purpose of this letter is to provide instruction and guidance for artillery support of convoys between DAU TIENG and TAY NINH. As an inclosure is a strip map with all Check Points and on-call targets available from the artillery control headquarters at either TAY NINH or DAU TIENG.

f. The Meteorological Section continues to fulfill its primary mission of furnishing metro data to artillery units in TAY NINH Province. In addition, Meteorological data is furnished to Air-Weather Service (AWS) Detachment at TAY NINH Base Camp. Surface observation data continues to be furnished the 45th Surgical Hospital at TAY NINH for research concerning modifications of the ventilation and air-conditioning systems of the complex. This meteorological section was the first station to send records of meteorological data to the Atmospheric Science Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. This data is used in research aimed at improving meteorological data for artillery units in tropical climates. The data is also used to expand and increase the professional meteorologist's knowledge of local and overall weather conditions existing in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Receipt of the soundings has been acknowledged by the Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory with the following statements:

"These data represent a most significant increase in knowledge of tropical circulations and we intend to make full use of them..... We reduced these data using digital computers and among other analyses have compared the accuracies of the ballistic parameters obtained by the Metro station against the values given by the computer. In 50% of the cases, the difference in computed ballistic wind varied from the manual values by less than 25 mils, and the absolute value of the wind speed difference averaged less than one knot. In the case of ballistic density, over 70% of the differences were within the accuracy of the measurement. Overall, this is remarkable accuracy for a field unit!.... We wish to commend personnel of this station who have continued over the period of many months to make accurate soundings for artillery purposes under what may be described as less than optimum conditions...."

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g. During this reporting period the survey teams have extended survey control to twelve artillery firing positions, only two of which were for organic firing elements. The remainder were for transient units. Survey control was established for six mortar positions, two of which were for organic mortar sections. Other significant activities are as follows:

(1) As a continued updating of the artillery defense for the Special Forces/CIDG camps within range of this unit's organic artillery, the survey section furnished survey control to each of the camps, two being more than 20 kilometers from this headquarters. The survey teams put in target area and position area survey for the countermortar and defensive concentrations, thereby insuring that the best data is available.

(2) When this headquarters assumed artillery defense of TAY NINH Base Camp no survey data was available for the actual location of the perimeter and bunker defense. A complete perimeter survey, to include the survey of all bunkers so that close-in defensive concentrations could be planned for the Base Camp was completed on 12 July 1967. On 14 July 1967, this headquarters published a letter listing the surveyed coordinates of all perimeter bunkers. Attached as an inclosure is a 1:50,000 overlay depicting the Base Camp configuration. A listing of all defensive concentrations was made and given to every unit on the base camp for use in the perimeter bunkers and by artillery and mortar units.

h. On 2 June 1967 three officers and fourteen enlisted men attended orientation classes at II Field Force Vietnam Artillery on FADAC. Issue of FADAC to this battalion is scheduled for late September or early October.

i. On 10 July 1967 a mortar platoon sergeant from the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry (Mechanized) conducted refresher training classes on the 81-mm mortar for the mortar crews of the sections in Headquarters and C Batteries. The same classes are scheduled for Battery B on a later date.

j. This headquarters scheduled functional firing for all organic elements during the period 26-31 July. A firing range was established on the perimeter under the control of the S3 as safety officer. Weapons test fired included the M-14 and M-16 rifles, M-79 Grenade Launcher, M-60 Machine gun, .50 caliber Machine gun, .45 and .38 caliber pistols. All weapons of the battalion were test fired. Since all facilities had been arranged, this headquarters opened the range to all other artillery units at TAY NINH Base Camp. Functional Firing will be scheduled on a monthly basis. Battery B at SUOI DA conducts functional firing every two weeks.

k. This headquarters was host to an ordnance instruction team on the M-540 Cargo Carrier between 6-8 July 1967. Classes were attended by personnel from this headquarters; 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery; 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery and 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

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k. This headquarters was host to an ordnance instruction team on the M-548 Cargo Carrier between 6-8 July 1967. Classes were attended by personnel from this headquarters; 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery; 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery and 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.

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4. (C) Operations

a. Disposition of the units at the beginning of the reporting period was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Batteries	TAY NINH (XT 141 522)
Battery A	CU CHI (XT 635 755)
Battery B	SUOI DA (XT 345 577)
Battery C	TAY NINH (XT 167 521)

b. At the beginning of the reporting period Battery A was an 8-inch battery, having converted two (2) 175mm guns to 8-inch howitzers in preparation for Operation MANHATTAN on 212205 April. Battery A remained at the Fire Support Base at SUOI CAO until 081300 May when it returned to CU CHI, becoming a composite battery. B and C Batteries remained composite batteries throughout the reporting period.

c. Units of the battalion participated in the following operations:

(1) On 010645 May Battery C deployed on an Artillery Assault mission to the Special Forces Camp at TRAI BI (XT 115 690). Security was provided by a Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Purpose of the artillery assault was to take under fire those hard targets in northwestern WAR ZONE "C" which normally are out of range of the 175mm guns from base camp positions. During the assault 131 8-inch and 38 175mm rounds were fired at hard targets.

(2) On 270857 May, Battery C deployed to TRAI BI (XT 113 696) in support of Operation DIAMONDHEAD (Continued). Battery C fired a total of 793 8-inch and 408 175mm rounds. On 011010 June, Battery C (-) returned to TAY NINH Base Camp. The 8-inch platoon was attached to 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, and proceeded to Fire Support/Patrol Base AUGUST (XT 2899 6353). The 8-inch platoon was used in direct and assault fire against caves and structures on NUI BA DEN mountain. The 8-inch platoon fired a total of 314 rounds. On 030800 June the 8-inch platoon reverted to parent control and returned to TAY NINH Base Camp.

(3) On 311045 May, Battery A conducted an Artillery Assault at TRUNG LAP (XT 5866 2171), firing on hard targets being reoccupied by enemy forces after Operation MANHATTAN. A total of 79 rounds were fired. At 311755 hours the battery returned to its base camp at CU CHI.

(4) During the period 6 June to 1 July 1967, Battery B (SUOI DA) and Battery C (TAY NINH) supported a Special Forces SIGMA operation in eastern WAR ZONE "C". On 27 June 1967, one gun of Battery C was sent to SUOI DA to augment the fires of Battery B when the operation moved into the northern section of WAR ZONE "C" and out of the battery's range from base camp. (The gun

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returned to TAY NINH on 011429 July.) The other gun remained at TAY NINH Base Camp to cover SUOI DA and give immediate artillery response if the Base Camp were attacked. 14

(5) On 080950 July the 8-inch platoon of Battery C was tested on its contingency plans for moving to a 'jump' position in support of SUOI DA. The platoon was in position (XT 2985 5090) in 30 minutes and fired four (4) close-in defensive targets around SUOI DA, expending 23 rounds. The platoon returned at 081255 hours.

(6) On 100705 July the 175mm gun platoon of Battery C conducted another artillery assault from TRAI BI expending 136 175mm rounds. The platoon returned at 101739 hours.

(7) Due to the intelligence information indicating an extensive buildup in WAR ZONE "C", Battery A was moved from CU CHI on 130645 July, closing at TAY NINH Base Camp at 131800 hours. Battery A occupied a position adjacent to Battery C, but remained in a field position posture. The purpose was to experiment with construction of field fortifications which would become standard for the firing batteries in field positions. A final construction design was approved and published as Annex G to the TAC SOP.

(8) As the intelligence information indicated the buildup of enemy forces was shifting into eastern WAR ZONE "C", plans were made to increase 175mm gun fires into that area. On 270837 July 1967, Battery C was moved into an Artillery Assault position at DAU TIENG (XT 4973 4776). The battery closed at DAU TIENG at 271215 hours and remains in that location at the end of this reporting period. From DAU TIENG Battery C can attack targets with 8-inch howitzers and 175mm guns (Zone II) which would normally require Battery B to fire using Zone III. From this position Battery C can increase the support given to elements of the B-32 Team (Special Forces) located at MINH THANH.

d. On 221400 May 1967, Battery B fired the 100,000th round of the 2d Battalion (175mm Gun SP), 32d Artillery in the Republic of Vietnam. The lanyard was pulled by the Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group.

e. In a continuing effort to make artillery fires from this battalion more effective in support of the Special Forces/CIDG operations, an artillery officer began a series of scheduled visits to each of the A-Team camps on 14 June 1967 and conducted classes on artillery observed fires and adjustment. The officer spent an average of two days at each location. During that time, close-in defensive targets were adjusted from the berm of the camps by the Special Forces team members. In those locations where close proximity to inhabited areas made the adjustments unsafe, the team members were flown by battalion aircraft to areas where adjustment from the air could be made. In addition, aircraft was made available to the Camp Commanders to conduct aerial reconnaissance near their respective camps and over areas of particular interest. Knowing now the capability of the artillery units and the support that they can give, more and more requests for the use of

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artillery are being received from Special Forces camps. An average of 20 H&I targets are requested by each camp every night.

f. On 061400 June a coordination-working meeting was held at B-32, 5th Special Forces, TAY NINH. Purpose of the meeting was to inform all who attended, of the manner in which this headquarters as the Fire Support Coordination Center for TAY NINH Province could, and would, support Special Forces/CIDG and/or ARVN - operations throughout the Province. At the same time a mutual exchange of intelligence information was accomplished and better channels established for dissemination of more information. As a result of this meeting, outstanding working arrangements have been formed between this headquarters and the others concerned. The meeting was attended by the Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group; Commanding Officer B-32 Team; Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery; the S2 and Assistant S3 of the battalion; all Special Forces A-Team Commanders and the MACV Advisors.

g. On 26 1300 June 1967 a Forward Air Controller for the B-32 Team visited this headquarters and was briefed on artillery support and operations in TAY NINH Province. In addition he was briefed on this headquarters' visual reconnaissance program. Periodic coordination meetings and briefings have been held between the S2, S3, and Aviation Officers of this headquarters and the Forward Air Controllers of B-32 Team.

h. On 301300 June 1967 a firepower demonstration was held at Battery B (SUOI DA) for the TAY NINH Province Chief; Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; Commanding Officer B-32 Team; Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery; Commanding Officer of the ARVN 105 Battery; Special Forces A-Team Commanders, staff officers and MACV Advisors. Demonstration included firing of a Beehive canister, direct fire of a 175mm gun using powder only, assault fire of 175mm gun and 8-inch howitzer against the side of NUI BA DEN mountain, and rapid fire of the M-42 (DUSTER) and M-55 (Quad-50) weapons. Purpose of the demonstration was to show the capabilities of each weapon and defense available at SUOI DA.

i. In each twenty-four hour period this headquarters conducts an unannounced test of the counter mortar and counter rocket programs for which it is responsible. With the interlocking fires programmed by this headquarters, the counter mortar (and counter rocket) tests are conducted for twelve separate programs and minimum of eight firing units. Reaction time required is three minutes. This standard has been met in 85% of the tests. Of the remaining percentage, 14% are within a five minute time frame and 1% within a ten minute time frame. Those tests which exceeded the time limit involved relaying tubes which were conducting other missions.

j. The period 1 May - 31 July 1967 has been marked by a step-up in VC/NVA activities in and around SUOI DA and the Base Camp of Battery B. Enemy activity has been limited to harassing tactics and no major contact has been made, although on 9 July at 0410 hours, 25 to 30 incoming 82mm mortar rounds landed outside the perimeter causing negative casualties and damage. The "Dusters" on the perimeter saw the flashes and immediately returned fire and the mortars

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were silenced. Offensive and defensive efforts of the base camp have been consistent with the increase in enemy activity and buildup. H&I programs have been intensified using the primary weapons of the battery as well as its 81mm mortars. Automatic weapons (6 Dusters and 2 Quad-50s) attached to the battery are used for close-in fire around the perimeter. The ARVN 105 platoon co-located with the battery has increased its H&I fires. The base camp perimeter wire network has been strengthened and additional trip flares, claymore mines and fougasse drums have been emplaced. Perimeter bunkers have been rebuilt to provide better overhead cover. Grass and weeds around the perimeter have been a problem, since chemical defoliation and burning were unsuccessful. A full-time Vietnamese labor force has been used to keep the grass cut and under control. Experiments with a farm harrow, pulled by an APC, are proving to be very successful. Perimeter illumination is accomplished with 81mm mortars and the use of four attached AN/M-55-3 searchlights (IR and Visual light). Self-illumination of the battery position with 105mm howitzers has been tested and found to be very effective.

k. The operations section constructed a 35 foot tower behind the Fire Support Coordination Center. This tower has two platforms: one at the 15 foot level and one at the 32 foot level. To facilitate better communications a RC-292 antenna is mounted on the top of each of its three legs. From 1900 hours to 0700 hours a mortar watch guard is stationed in the top platform. His equipment includes a BC scope and Starlight scope. There is a direct telephone link between the tower and the fire support coordination center below. Since the tower is only 100 meters from the perimeter and the guard has an unobstructed view of 80% of the perimeter, he can give direction and range to suspect locations and adjust fire. The tower is surveyed in by a DME team and all artillery and mortar units have its grid plotted. The tower has been used as a SCP to extend survey to two firing positions at the base of NUI BA DEN mountain, a distance of 10 kilometers. In the near future, the tower will be used to adjust fire on close-in defensive concentrations around the TAY NINH Base Camp.

l. On 3 June 1967 this headquarters conducted a briefing for the new Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

m. On 14 July 1967 this headquarters became the only Artillery Air Warning Control Station for TAY NINH Province. This includes broadcasting air data from all permanent and temporary firing positions in TAY NINH Province and routing aircraft into clear traffic patterns.

n. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

UNIT	NO OF MSNS FIRED	AMMO EXPENDED	
		8-inch	175mm
Battery A	3,510	4,775	4,439
Battery B	6,636	8,227	6,091
Battery C	7,532	7,324	6,924
TOTAL	17,678	20,326	17,454

o. On 19 July 1967 five of this unit's organic 8-inch howitzers were calibrated. The sixth was not operational during the scheduled period and will be calibrated at a later date.

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5. (C) Logistics.

a. Ammunition Trains. During the reporting period the supply operations of the ammunition trains were carried on in an effecient manner.

(1) Support of Battery A at CU CHI was accomplished through coordination with 34th Ordnance Battalion at LONG BINH. As the Ammunition Convoy departed LONG BINH for TAY NINH ASP, certain trucks carrying 8-inch and 175-mm ammunition were ear-marked for Battery A and left the convoy at CU CHI. These vehicles rejoined the convoy on its return trip from TAY NINH to LONG BINH.

(2) The primary effort of the ammunition trains has been resupply of Battery B located at SUOI DA (XT 345 577). Due to the extremely limited storage space in the battery area and large requirements for ammunition at SUOI DA, it has been necessary to keep the ammunition trains on the road nearly every day. The longest period that a stock pile was obtained, and hence the ammunitions trains off the road, was for six days. During this period, the road between SUOI DA and TAY NINH (EAST) was not a secure road and it was necessary that it be swept each day before the convoy moved. These restrictions greatly increased the turn-around time for the convoys. The ammunition train would depart for Battery B after 1200 hours on one day, unload, spend the night, and return the next day. Frequently, on return to TAY NINH the ammunition train would reload, time permitting, and join the convoy to SUOI DA on the same day..

b. Supply Operations. The following Shortages considered combat essential, were not available to this organization during the reporting period:

ITEM	DOCUMENT#	DOCUMENT CONT#	FOLLOWED UP ON	STATUS
TRUCK, 5 TON, * M54A2, 1 ea	B/6333-001	AT8149-6341-7581	AE1 7190	BB WRR
TRUCK, 2½ TON, M35A2 w/w, 1 ea	A/7166-003	AT8149-7166-6005	AE1 7187	BB WRR
THEODOLITE, SURVEYING 0.2 Dir, 1 ea	B/7128-003	AT81QZ-7129-0101	AE1 7182	BM WRB
TENT GP SMALL 1 ea	C/7028-003	AT80HK-7030-1007	AE1 7180	BB WRR
TELESCOPE PANORAMIC M115, 3 ea	B/7031-003	AT80HK-7032-1008	AE1 7180	BB-BL to WRB
TENT GP MED 3 ea	B/7039-005	AT80HK-7039-1005	AE1 7156	BD WRZ

* Received from 1st Dn, 27th Arty on lateral transfer.

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TENT GP SMALL 4 ea	B/7047-005	AT80HK-7048-1004	AE1 7180	BL to WRB
GEN SET 10 KW 1 ea	B/7080-006	AT8149-7091-7520	AE1 7140	WRB
GEN SET PE-75 1 ea	B/7080-007	AT8149-7089-6000	AE1 7133	BM WRZ
GEN SET 3KW 400cy 8 ea	B/7080-008	AT8149-7091-7521	AE1 7140	BB WRB
TENT GP MED 1 ea	C/7098-003	AT80HK-7103-1008	AE1 7175	WRB
GEN SET 5 KW 1 ea	C/7137-001	AT81QZ-7137-0056	AE1 7182	BM WRB
RECOVERY VEHICLE M-587 2 ea	A/7032-002	(thru 23d Gp)	AF1 7118	UNK

c. Maintenance.

(1) The down-time for the M107 and M110 Vehicles during the reporting period was as follows:

(a) M107, 175mm Gun (SP)

1. Possible days available: 552
2. Days deadlined: 15
3. Available days: 537
4. Deadline rate: 3%

(b) M110, 8-inch Howitzer (SP)

1. Possible days available: 552
2. Days deadlined: 25
3. Available days: 527
4. Deadline rate: 5%

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(2) Critical parts during this reporting period that were difficult to obtain were:

<u>NOUN</u>	<u>QTY DEMANDED</u>	<u>FSN</u>
Relay, Solenoid	3 ea	5945-612-5740
Belts, V	4 sets	3030-528-6795
Regulator	2 ea	2920-335-4264
Switch JCA	15 ea	5930-699-9085
Check Valve Assy	2 ea	2520-735-4225
PTO Pump	1 ea	2520-860-1057
Rectifier	10 ea	7381028 (No FSN)
Switch Lockout Assy	2 ea	2520-736-0236
Housing	10 ea	2520-930-0246
Motor Hyd Pump	3 ea	6105-513-9631

6. (U) Aviation:

a. The following aviation missions, listed by sorties, were flown during this reporting period.

	<u>Cmd & Con</u>	<u>Recon</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>Admin</u>	<u>Maint</u>	<u>Pax</u>	<u>Cgo</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Rotary Wing (OH-13)	229	3	7	172	8	212	1.6	161
Fixed Wing (O-1)	<u>0</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>269</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>515</u>
TOTALS	229	172	200	441	20	282	1.6	676

b. The main problem encountered by the Aviation Section during this reporting period which seriously affected the aircraft was the extremely poor quality of the Aradmac rebuilt O-470-15 Bird Dog engines. Several engines had to be changed at the 60-70 hour level and one engine lasted only four (4) hours. The main deficiencies lie in the improper installation of piston and piston rings and inadequate check of tolerances. An emergency EIR has been submitted in accordance with TM 38-750.

c. The direct support maintenance unit for this unit's organic aircraft is the 605 Transportation Company (ABS) located at PHU LOI -- a 35 minute flight by O-1D and a 50 minute flight by OH-13. Forty-five percent of all non-usable flight time is due to the flight to and from the maintenance unit.

7. (C) Communications.

a. Throughout the reporting period constant FM radio communications were maintained with all firing batteries with brief intermittent periods of jamming and traffic interference. Traffic interference grew from the fact that the Battalion Command and Fire Direction Frequency assigned this unit for the month of June was also the Fire Direction Frequency of another artillery unit.

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After switching to the assigned alternate frequency it was found that that frequency was the one used by the control tower at CU CHI. Although ground stations did not cause interference with the control tower because of distance, airborne organic aircraft made the frequency unusable for the tower and it had to be changed.

b. Although maintenance continues to be a major problem, the unusually high deadline rate is tapering off. Two reasons account for the improved situation: (1) The assigned communications officer of this battalion is now a trained Signal Officer; and (2), personal liaison and follow-through on the maintenance channels have decreased the time equipment remains in the repair and maintenance channels. Still, three out of five AN/GRC-46 rigs remain in a deadline status due to failure of component parts. An analysis of the work orders and visits to the 610th Maintenance at PHU LOI indicates a severe shortage of repair parts at higher echelon maintenance facilities. Some radios have remained in channels for as long as 90 days before returning to the unit.

c. When the AN/GRC-46 is operational, this unit experiences severe atmospheric static after sundown that limits broadcasting time. Most of the problems in transmitting, receiving and failure to obtain clear copy is due to an atmospheric condition known as inversion. Receipt of the AN/GRC-106 which uses a single sideband technique should alleviate these problems.

d. A new crypto facility has been constructed and is in the last stages of completion. This facility which is built of 8 x 12 inch beams, 3 x 6 inch siding and is encased in 5 layers of sandbags, houses the RTT equipment, crypto storage area, and message center.

e. With the onset of the wet monsoon, maintenance problems increase. The TA/312 telephone must be checked daily to insure moisture does not collect in the ring generator causing shorts and other malfunctions. Each telephone is checked daily by the communications section and PM personnel.

f. During the period 25 June 1967 to 1 July 1967, this headquarters furnished a radio relay team to support the Special Forces Sigma operation in War Zone "C". This team was located at the Special Forces/CIDG Camp at PREK KLOK (XT 276 776). Purpose of the team was to relay messages between the artillery Forward Observer with the SIGMA Force and this headquarters. Information relayed were fire missions and intelligence data.

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SECTION II

PART I OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

a. ITEM: Turn-in of Monthly Payrolls

(1) DISCUSSION: Monthly payrolls for four of the five batteries in this battalion are normally delivered to TAY NINH Base Camp by a representative of 91st Finance. (The fifth payroll is normally picked up at 91st Finance and presents no problem.) These payrolls are picked up at TAY NINH Base Camp by respective battery Class A agents and unit personnel are paid. Upon completion of payment, payrolls must be returned separately by each respective battery Class A agent to 91st Finance at LONG BINH. This usually requires at least one day and in several instances has required as much as three days.

(2) OBSERVATION: 91st Finance should cause their representative to return to TAY NINH Base Camp a specified number of days after pay day to pick up payroll returns. This would result in one or two days lost time for one person rather than for four personnel.

b. ITEM: Promotion-Direct Hire Civilian Personnel

(1) DISCUSSION: A small number of Direct Hire Civilian personnel may be promoted from worker positions to worker supervisory positions. Recommendations are normally processed through the battalion S1 to the Area Civilian Personnel Office where promotion action is taken. Promotion action takes an abnormally long time to complete and recommendations are periodically rejected for inadequate justification or some technical reason (e.g. insufficient time in grade..). In the past, civilian personnel have been told of their impending promotion at the time of submission of promotion recommendations. In many cases civilian personnel receive the impression that promotion action has already occurred. (This probably is due to language difficulties.) This mistaken impression results in recurring pay complaints which no amount of explanation seems to correct.

(2) OBSERVATION: When promotion of a civilian employee is contemplated one of the following techniques should be used to avoid needless administrative problems:

(a) Have the promotion situation explained thoroughly to the prospective promotee by someone known to be capable of proper interpretation. Insure that the time factor and the possibility of recommendation rejection are brought to the attention of the employee.

(b) Tell the employee nothing of the promotion recommendation until it is finally approved.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

2. (C) Intelligence

a. ITEM: Collection of Intelligence Information.

(1) DISCUSSION: The reporting, collection and dissemination of intelligence information through normal channels takes a minimum of two and normally three to five days. This time lag is unacceptable for artillery targeting.

(2) OBSERVATION: To reduce the reaction time, artillery targeting personnel must establish close liaison with all collection agencies within its area of interest. This may be accomplished by either of two methods:

(a) Make daily liaison visits and exchange of information and intelligence.

(b) Coordinate to be an addressee when daily liaison visits are impractical.

3. (C) Training and Organization

a. ITEM: "Dustoff" Notification Procedures.

(1) DISCUSSION: Recently a unit received a request for medical evacuation of a wounded ARVN soldier. The request reached the unit fire direction center where much valuable time was lost since personnel were not familiar with procedures for requesting evacuation. Fortunately, the individual was not wounded critically. It was readily apparent that an unnecessary delay such as this could result in dire consequences. In cases of extreme emergencies, it should not be necessary to search through an SOI for required "Dustoff" information.

(2) OBSERVATION: All personnel must be made familiar with "Dustoff" procedures. It is particularly important that personnel in a supervisory capacity and those working in an operation center know the proper procedures. Two methods are suggested to insure familiarity:

(a) Prepare a chart containing essential elements to "Dustoff" request. All known information can be posted in advance (radio frequency, telephone numbers, unit location, etc.). Chart should be posted conspicuously in the fire direction center (or operation center) to provide a ready reference for personnel.

(b) For the benefit of all personnel, "Dustoff" procedures should be covered frequently during formations, scheduled CI periods, etc.

4. (C) Operations.

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1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

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a. ITEM: Sandbagging of Vehicles.

(1) DISCUSSION: Recently, a 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck from this unit was destroyed after hitting a road mine. The vehicle was heavily sandbagged and as a result, only one passenger out of four was slightly injured. This injury was as a result of the passenger being knocked against a part of the vehicle by the concussion, and not due to shrapnel. Reaction by the passengers was immediate. Personnel at the scene of the incident gave a complete report as to personnel injured, vehicle damage, location of incident and action taken. This resulted in a minimum of confusion and delay in requesting medical evacuation, vehicle recovery, and notification of injured through channels.

(2) OBSERVATION: Sandbagging of vehicles does save lives. Complete and decisive action, properly rehearsed, eliminates confusion and delay.

5. (U) Logistics

a. ITEM: Lifting Equipment

(1) DISCUSSION: Due to the nature of the conflict in RVN, heavy batteries are located many miles from their parent organization. In one case, a battery is located over 60 miles from the battalion headquarters. No wrecker or other type of lifting support is immediately available to the battery. Since heavy loads of ammunition must be lifted many times daily, it is essential that each battery be provided some type of lifting equipment assigned on a permanent basis. When lifting capability is not available from the battalion, the unit must attempt a loan of lifting equipment from other units stationed with it. This causes unnecessary delays and lost time in seeking out "loans" of equipment.

(2) OBSERVATION: All heavy batteries in RVN should have a wrecker or M-578 (VTR) assigned on a permanent basis.

b. ITEM: Engineer Support for construction of heavy artillery positions.

(1) DISCUSSION: Before the advent of the rainy season, this unit conducted a crash program from acquiring engineer support in the proper preparation and construction of heavy artillery gun pads and berms. Numerous visit and requests for additional engineer support have not been successful. Access to the gun pads for resupply of ammunition has been seriously hampered due to lack of suitable access roads. The increased rainfall has caused heavy erosion to the partially constructed berms (which are of an extremely lowgrade laterite or plain clay and/or dirt). Spading of the heavy weapons is unstable and results in slippage of the lay of the weapon during a fire mission or sticking of the spade in the poor berm material. Weapons must be constantly relaid and respade, causing an intolerable delay in fire missions. Each day the berms must be reconstructed, piled and packed.

(2) OBSERVATION: Heavy gun positions should be given a higher priority for engineer support to correct these deficiencies. Delays in engineer

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

effort result in delayed response to fire missions and damage to the gun pad and/or weapons.

6. (U) Aviation

a. ITEM: Landing of fixed wing aircraft at remote and seldom used airstrips.

(1) DISCUSSION: Fixed wing airstrips at remote locations, e.g., SUOI DA, TRAI BI, etc., are infrequently used by fixed wing aircraft and seldom on a regular basis. These strips have become the pathways of cattle, water buffalo and the congregation points for local civilians. On several occasions this unit's aircraft have started landing and touchdown on what appeared to be a completely isolated and clear airstrip, only to have cattle, water buffalo and civilians dash from the brush on one side of the strip to the other side. Aircraft have had to take immediate evasive action and on one occasion had to veer to the side of the strip severely damaging a wheel.

(2) OBSERVATION: Before landing at remote and/or seldom used fixed wing strips, pilots must make a low level reconnaissance pass to insure that uncontrolled animals and/or unknowledgeable civilians do not make quick and startled moves that could create hazardous landing conditions.

7. (U) Communications:

a. ITEM: Damage to and by vehicle mounted whip antennas.

(1) DISCUSSION: Vehicle mounted whip antennas when in an erect position on a vehicle travelling through populated civilian areas and base camps will strike overhanging branches, wires, and structures, causing damage to the antennas or to the structure it encounters. Several antennas have been snapped and wires cut or shorted.

(2) OBSERVATION: When a vehicle travels in populated areas or base camps, the whip antenna should be tied down to the center of the front bumper. The tip of the antenna should be allowed to remain at a height of seven (7) feet to avoid striking personnel and causing injury.

SECTION II

PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

That the 91st Finance Company representative return to TAY NINH Base Camp a specified number of days after pay day to pick up payroll returns, rather than each Class A Agent being required to return his payroll personally to LONG BINH.

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1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

2. (U) Intelligence.

That more timely dissemination of intelligence information be given to responsible artillery headquarters so that lucrative targets can be attacked immediately.

3. (U) Operations.

That all vehicles operating outside of base camp be required to be sandbagged.

4. (U) Logistics.

That priority of engineer support be obtained to bring heavy artillery gun pads up to standard, durable construction.

5. (U) Aviation

That pilots be reminded that a low-level reconnaissance of remote, and/or seldom used fixed wing airstrips must be made before landing.

6. (U) Communications.

That vehicles equipped with whip antennas operating in populated areas be required to have the antenna tied down to the center of the front bumper to prevent damage to antenna and structures.

Leland A. Wilson
LELAND A. WILSON
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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AVGL-C

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RC-CSFCR-65) UIC: W22AAA(U)

Department of the Army, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289,
20 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, Artillery, ATTN: AVPB-PAC, APO 96266

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery is approved.
2. (U) Section I, paragraph 6b. This headquarters has experienced similar early engine changes on rebuilt engines and has also submitted an RIR.
3. (C) Section I, paragraph 7b. A shortage of repair parts at the Direct Support Maintenance Unit does exist; however, the situation is improving.
4. (U) Section II, Part I, paragraph 5a. Concur. A request for Issue in Excess of Authorized Allowance, USARV Form 47R, was submitted on 3 February 1967 for one M578 per firing battery.
5. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 1. Concur. This problem was brought to the attention of the 91st Finance for resolution. Although the 91st Finance has agents it can send to Tay Ninh to receive payroll turnbacks, it does not have the transportation capability to and from Tay Ninh. This headquarters will endeavor to use one of our aircraft if the 91st Finance cannot provide the service.
6. (C) Section II, Part II, paragraph 2. Concur. Battalions characteristically maintain intelligence liaison with all available local sources. This headquarters furnishes all available intelligence considered to be useful to subordinate elements. Means will continue to be exploited to improve and accelerate acquisition and dissemination of intelligence information.
7. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 3. Concur. This recommendation is already the policy of this command for vehicles operating on insecure roads.
8. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4. Concur. Accurate and timely delivery of heavy artillery fires requires a firm, substantial firing area.
9. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 5. Concur.
10. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 6. Concur.

*Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

Robert J. Koch
ROBERT J. KOCH
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFB-FAC (1 Aug 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

DA, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, APO 96266 19 Sep 67

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (UIC: WA2AA), adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (U) Section II, Part I, paragraph 5a. On 25 August MTO&E recommendations were submitted to USARV. One of the significant recommendations was for the addition of one M578 Recovery Vehicle to the equipment authorized each heavy artillery firing battery.

3. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 1. Concur with comment in paragraph 5, 1st Indorsement.

4. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. Concur.

5. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 4. Concur. The conditions indicated have been corrected by the engineers. In view of the type soil found in Vietnam from which heavy artillery batteries operate, a high priority for engineer support to build and maintain heavy artillery positions is required.

6. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 5. Concur. This subject is continually addressed in the safety news letters published by aviation units in II FFORCEV.

t/RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVFBC-H (1 Aug 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 23 SEP 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGS-DH, APO 96375

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This command concurs with the recommendations of the basic report as modified by the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc

R. E. Wandschneider
R. E. WANDSCHNEIDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 NOV 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion (175MM)(SP), 32d Artillery (A2AA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Promotion-Direct Hire Civilian Personnel, page 18, paragraph 1b.

(1) Nonconcur in the recommendation included in the discussion relating to the inadequacy of the current procedures on promotion of direct hire civilian personnel. Procedures to accomplish this type of personnel action are promulgated in paragraph 4b, USARV Regulation 690-1 and USARV Regulation 690-2. In most cases, promotion of a direct hire Vietnamese National employee involves a position change rather than an independent personnel action. All civilian position changes require justification for such action and include position review and approval by the appointing authority. The appointing authority is also responsible for determining a particular employee's qualifications and eligibility for promotion and/or assignment to a particular position.

(2) The discussion alludes to supervisor-employee communications problems stemming from erroneous assumption of authority by the supervisor. To avoid future occurrences as cited in referenced discussion, commanders of organizations should, in coordination with servicing Area Civilian Personnel Officers, establish procedures which would meet the policy requirements of USARV Regulation 690-2.

b. Reference item concerning lifting equipment, page 20, paragraph 5a. Concur with the requirement for some type of lift capability. All Army commands were notified by USARV Msg AVHGC-OT 19073 DTG 251132Z Mar 67 concerning procedures necessary to request excess equipment. In

*Downgraded at 3 year Intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

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GROUP 4
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DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 67)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

addition, both personnel and equipment are being addressed in the current standardization program.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa

C. S. NAKATSUKASA

Captain, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years -
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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GPOP-DT (1 Aug 67)

5th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 2d Battalion (175mm) (SP), 32d Artillery (UIC: WA2AAA)
(RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 5 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

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(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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